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Resumen
Este artículo estudia los miembros colectivos de los 
partidos políticos. Los miembros colectivos pueden ser 
definidos como organizaciones que poseen a la vez 
derechos de autogobierno plenos y derecho a participar 
en los procesos de toma decisiones en el partido político 
en el que están integrados. El artículo propone una 
tipología descriptiva de los miembros colectivos que 
tiene en cuenta su naturaleza sociopolítica (partidista o 
funcional) y su patrón de articulación dentro del partido 
en el que están integrados (si ayudan o no a articular 
el conjunto de la estructura partidaria). Asimismo, el 
artículo ilustra estos subtipos a partir del examen de 
varias organizaciones políticas europeas que cumplen 
(o se acercan a cumplir) las características definitorias 
de los miembros colectivos. Este análisis se basa en 
el examen de todas las organizaciones políticas que 
alcanzaron más de un 4% de los votos en las últimas 
elecciones parlamentarias de 10 países europeos. El 
artículo concluye con un análisis de los determinantes y 
perspectivas de este tipo de organización.
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abstRaCt
This article focuses on the collective members of 
political parties. Collective members can be defined 
as organizations having both full self-government 
rights and entitlements to decision-making processes 
in the political parties in which they are embedded. 
This article proposes a basic descriptive typology of 
collective members that takes into consideration their 
sociopolitical nature (party political or functional) and 
their pattern of articulation within the party in which they 
are embedded (whether they help to articulate the whole 
party structure or not). It also illustrates these subtypes 
by examining European organizations that meet (or are 
close to meeting) the main defining characteristics of 
collective members. This examination is based on the 
analysis of all parties that attained at least 4% of the 
votes in the last national parliamentary elections in 
10 European countries. The article concludes with an 
analysis of the determinants and prospects of this type 
of party structure.
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IntRoduCtIon
Party membership is one of the most important el-
ements of political parties, and its study is critical to 
understand the nature, dynamics, policy choices and 
even electoral performance of political organizations 
(Scarrow 1996). When we think of party members 
we have in mind mostly single individuals, but as Du-
verger already saw (1958:22), there are instances in 
which the links between political parties and militants 
are indirect. In such cases, individuals are integrated 
into parties through the channels of collateral, interme-
diate social or political organizations (Poguntke 2002). 
These organizations are sometimes subjected 
to the statutory jurisdiction of the party (as is usu-
ally the case of youth organizations or regional units 
of parties), even if they have juridical personality. In 
other cases, however, these organizations are not 
subjected to the statutory jurisdiction of the party: 
they enjoy full self-government rights. When these 
organizations also have the right to participate in 
the decision-making processes of the political party 
we can consider them as collective members of the 
party. On most occasions, intermediate political or-
ganizations enjoying both full self-government and 
representation rights in the party have come into be-
ing exogenously, and only afterwards have been inte-
grated into the overall party structure, somewhat re-
sembling the coming-together historical path of some 
federations and confederations (Stepan 2001:315 ff.; 
Riker 1964). It is no accident in fact that Duverger 
(1958:23) established a clear parallelism between 
indirect parties and confederate states. Certainly, as 
Duverger himself remarked apropos of the Austrian 
ÖVP (1958:29-30), endogenously created organiza-
tions can also achieve very high levels of political 
autonomy and give rise to models of indirect party 
membership. In such cases, however, the central 
bodies of the encompassing political party usually 
keep the ultimate authority on intermediate political 
organizations, which leads to a hierarchical balance 
of power between both organizational levels. It is for 
this reason that in this article we restrict the label of 
collective members to 1) fully self-governing organi-
zations not subjected to the party statutory jurisdic-
tion that 2) have representative rights in the decision-
making processes of the overall political party. 
These two characteristics, self-rule and partici-
pation in shared-rule, resemble the characteristics 
of what Hooghe and Marks (2003) have labeled as 
the type I of multilevel governance and of federal-
ism in particular (Elazar 1991; Hooghe, Marks and 
Schakel 2010). For this reason, their emergence 
and persistence can be approached in light of the 
trade-offs posed by different multilevel governance 
models (in particular regarding their levels of decen-
tralization and the size of governance units) (Hooghe 
and Marks 2016). However, as will be shown below, 
collective members do not necessarily have a terri-
torial character. Furthermore, the fact that collective 
members belong to organizations that compete in the 
electoral arena in order to reach power, and affect 
policies, sets specific costs and constraints to the 
emergence and persistence of this type of organiza-
tional structure. 
The concept of “collective member” of a party can 
be considered from a juridical or a political view-
point. The former meaning can be made precise in 
every legal system; if thus intended, the latter may 
have blurred contours, and depends not only on for-
mal rules, but also on informal institutions, behavio-
ral regularities, expectations and normative beliefs. 
Most typically, collective members are organizations 
having their own legal personality and resources. 
As for the relationships of the affiliates of collective 
members to the party, there are three main possibili-
ties. In the first case, simultaneous membership is 
excluded. This is the case when a regional party has 
an agreement with a national party by virtue of which 
the latter accepts a “hands off” clause: the national 
party refrains from setting up its organization (and 
putting forward candidates for elections) in the area 
covered by the regional party. Automatic transfer of 
membership in the event of a change in residence 
may then be part of the agreement. In the second 
case, simultaneous membership is accepted but si-
multaneous members are a minority in the collective 
member. This case typically happens when the two 
bonds involved are of a different nature (e.g., pro-
fessional and political). In the third case, simultane-
ous membership is accepted and prevailing (or even 
automatic). Here the obvious question is where the 
real loyalty lies (e.g., associated parties to the French 
UMP), especially in case of conflict.
The existence of collective members is an impor-
tant organizational feature of political parties, and 
as other organizational features, it can affect policy 
choices and electoral outcomes (Scarrow 1996:11-
13). In particular, the presence of collective members 
has important implications for the types of relation-
ships parties establish with their political activists and 
voters. Political parties can devise unified and homo-
geneous party structures that allow them to establish 
direct and uniform links to voters and political activ-
ists, or they can try to accommodate different sourc-
es of diversity (functional, ideological, cultural or ter-
ritorial) by incorporating differentiated and relatively 
autonomous political structures. Studies on political 
parties have addressed these alternatives by distin-
guishing between “direct” and “indirect” parties (Du-
verger 1958:22), and by referring to different levels of 
party systemness (Panebianco 1988) and centraliza-
tion (Duverger 1958); two concepts that map the de-
gree of autonomy of party subunits or subgroups and 
the power relationships between the party leadership 
and such party subunits. In turn, systemness and 
centralization exert a critical influence on the models 
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and levels of coordination (vertical as well as horizon-
tal) that prevail within party structures (Deschouwer 
2006). Systemness and vertical integration also have 
implications for the relationships between parties, 
activists and voters (Poguntke 2002), and can be 
associated to the degree of autonomy parties enjoy 
with regard to their environment and to their levels 
of institutionalization (Panebianco 1988). In some 
cases, party subunits assume the form of corporate 
members in the political party, thus weakening the 
direct links between the overall party and individual 
citizens (Poguntke 2002). When these components 
or subunits enjoy full political autonomy and specific 
entitlements to decision-making processes within the 
overall party, they can be characterized as collective 
members of the party.
The presence of collective members tends to re-
duce internal uniformity and negatively affects the 
control exercised by party leaders on different fields 
of party life (strategic, programmatic, ideological, 
electoral, etc.). In so doing, collective members in-
crease the costs of vertical and horizontal coordina-
tion (Deschouwer 2006), reduce party systemness, 
and weaken vertical integration. As in the case of 
other highly decentralized political structures, col-
lective members can make it more difficult for politi-
cal parties to adapt to new demands and compete 
successfully in the electoral arena, as has been 
shown by Kitschelt’s analysis on the relationships 
among social changes, internal party politics, and 
the electoral performance of social democratic par-
ties (Kitschelt 1994:207-253). Consequently, as in 
other multilevel structures, the existence of highly 
autonomous subunits within political parties can im-
pose significant costs (electoral in this case) to both 
other social groups and the political organizations 
in which they are embedded (Hooghe and Marks 
2016). On the other hand, collective members pro-
vide voters and activists with specific organizational 
and linkage environments (Poguntke 2002) adjust-
ed to formal institutions (such as multilevel govern-
ance and federalism) and diverse sociopolitical con-
texts and landscapes (Johnston 1990; Deschouwer 
2006). These organizational linkages can facilitate 
two-way communication between party elites and 
voters and help parties to improve their electoral 
results among specific social groups (Poguntke 
2002:45-46 and 57-58) and their access to different 
types of resources. They can thus favor decentral-
ized responsiveness and enhance the flow of soft 
information (Hooghe and Marks 2016). The organi-
zational structures of political parties must therefore 
balance the goals of internal coordination, electoral 
success, and access to resources. While the first 
goal can be enhanced by high levels of vertical inte-
gration and systemness, the last two may demand, 
in certain contexts, the development or persistence 
of differentiated and autonomous political struc-
tures. In turn, in the case of fully self-governing polit-
ical organizations, their integration into political par-
ties will also depend on the benefits in terms of the 
resources and policy-making impact that they can 
extract from this type of membership. Viewed from 
this perspective, the development and persistence 
of strong links between specific organizations (in-
cluding here collective members) and political par-
ties will be decisively affected by the mutual benefits 
rendered by this type of association (Christiansen 
2012). Among the most important characteristics af-
fecting the extent of these benefits will be socioeco-
nomic factors, territorial characteristics, interparty 
competition, and multilevel institutional frameworks 
(Deschouwer 2006; Christiansen 2012).
In the next section of this article we focus on two 
concepts that are critical to understand the nature of 
collective members: membership and articulation. 
Whereas the former refers to the specific mode of 
integration of the collective member in the political 
party in which it is embedded, the latter refers to the 
position and role of this type of organization in the 
overall party structure. In the third section we de-
velop a classification of collective members based 
on their nature (party political or functional) and 
on the role that they play in the articulation of the 
overall political party in which they are integrated. 
In this respect, this article follows the strategy, quite 
classical in the study of political parties, of devel-
oping typologies aimed at mapping differences and 
similarities among political organizations (Scarrow 
1996:28-29; Wolinetz 2002:138). In this section 
we also examine the degree to which several con-
temporary Western European political parties meet 
the criteria defined by our analysis. The cases we 
discuss here are based on the examination of all 
parties that attained at least 4% of the vote in the 
last general elections in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Spain, and Sweden. Finally, in our last section 
we analyze the determinants of this type of political 
structure, and explore its future prospects by exam-
ining some instances of quite recent party formation 
in which at least some favorable characteristics to 
this organizational structure were present.
membeRshIP and aRtICulatIon
As defined above, a collective member of a po-
litical party is an organization enjoying full political 
autonomy and having entitlements to participate in 
the decision-making processes of the political party. 
Collective members can be of a different socio-polit-
ical nature, depending on the characteristics of the 
groups they represent and target. Collective mem-
bers can be party organizations themselves repre-
senting distinctive ideological traditions or specific 
territorial constituencies. And they can also target 
specific socio-demographic groups, often of a socio-
economic and functional nature. 
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Both the overall political party and the collective 
member are political actors with an autonomous 
juridical status. The participation of the collective 
member in the political party can be carried out by its 
leadership or directly by the affiliates of the collective 
member (in the latter case, a weighting may be given 
to the vote of the members of the collective member 
if the personal members of the party also have the 
right to vote). When the participation of an organ-
ized group in the power of a political party is mainly 
carried out directly by the affiliates of the group, the 
question arises as to whether the group as such is 
a collective member, or rather the members of the 
group are directly members of the party. This kind 
of question was already posed by Duverger when 
he described indirect parties as based on the union 
of component social groups (Duverger 1958:23). In 
fact, the answer to the question of whether either the 
organized group or its members are members of the 
party depends on the extent to which the organized 
group keeps its decisional structure when it partici-
pates in party decisions. The decisional structure of 
the group comprises the organization of the group, 
but also its shared identity and its formal and infor-
mal rules. This decisional structure of the collective 
member of a political party is in principle affected 
by the fact that it belongs to an overarching political 
organization. In addition, it is through its decisional 
structure that the collective member (and thus its in-
dividual members if this is the case) participate in the 
decisions of the party.
What determines the framework for the relations 
among the collective members and the party and 
the rights of the collective members in the party 
decision making processes? In the first place, this 
framework is determined by the national legislation, 
the party constitution, and the contracts and agree-
ments established between collective members 
and the parties in which they are embedded. But in 
addition to formal rules and pacts, there will always 
be bargaining and handling among political actors. 
Overall, there will tend to be a considerable iner-
tia to alter party institutions and the so established 
balance of power. In any event, the agreement or 
contract between the collective member and the 
political party can be discontinued (whether this 
can be a unilateral decision depends on party rules 
and national laws), and then the collective mem-
ber finishes being so. If an organization joins the 
party as a collective member, then all members of 
the organization receive rights in the party. These 
rights in the party come automatically with member-
ship in the organization. The party has no control 
over this sort of “indirect membership.” Certainly, 
an organization can be expelled from the party if 
its character becomes unacceptable to the party. A 
different question, as mentioned above, is wheth-
er members of the collective member can also be 
members of the party.
There are important variations in the types of rela-
tionships of collective members with the political par-
ties in which they are embedded. A first critical aspect 
of these relationships concerns the formal pattern of 
integration of the collective member into the political 
party. When there is a contract between an organ-
ized group and a political party, it is critical whether 
this contract makes the group, as such, a member 
of the party, which entails sharing the ultimate deci-
sion power in the party. This is especially the case for 
constitutional (or statutory) decisions. Sometimes the 
contract between the collective member and the party 
is a sort of adhesion contract, and the representative 
rights of the collective member are to be determined 
by the organs of the party (in which certainly the col-
lective member may have a decisive weight); such 
is the case of the membership of the trade unions 
in the British Labour Party. At the opposite extreme, 
the rules determining the power relations between 
the collective member and the party can be set in 
the clauses of a pact between equals; a pact whose 
terms are bound to continue except for mutual agree-
ment. In such a case, the party has no possibility to 
alter these rules on its own accord, and they tend to 
be rigid. There is no organ in the party able to adapt 
the rules of the game to changing circumstances. If 
the maintenance of the relation between collective 
member and party is politically “unavoidable”, a path-
dependent and highly inertial political logic prevails 
(Pierson 2004), and the circumstances that led to the 
original constitutional pact among two organizations, 
perhaps exceptional or contingent, continue to exert 
a strong influence on the future, as in the classical 
pattern of historical causation. However, notwith-
standing the importance of former critical junctures 
and historical trajectories, both the party and the col-
lective member will necessarily keep re-examining 
the benefits and costs that they derive from their ex-
isting agreements.1 
A second crucial characteristic concerns the pat-
tern of articulation of collective members within the 
overall party structure. The presence of intermedi-
ate groups is characteristic of the structure of politi-
cal parties and allows political organizations to come 
closer to individual members. However, whereas in 
some cases the party creates specific and special-
ized organizations (for the young, for women, for the 
old…),2 in others, the party integrates intermediate 
organizations in an encompassing political frame-
work that starts from a partition (in the sense that 
each individual belongs to one and only one of the 
constituent units) of the population of the country and 
covers the whole organization. The term “articulation” 
refers here to this second model.
The most characteristic and typical articulation of 
political parties is territorial articulation. In this type 
of articulation, the intermediate groups correspond 
to geographical areas. Normally there are several 
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levels of articulation: local, regional, etc. (often one 
of these levels is decisive and the corresponding 
divisions even have juridical personality). The other 
main, potential source of articulation has a functional 
character and is based on the professional activity of 
individual members. By virtue of this structure, the 
party can emphasize its multiclass character and 
make visible a sort of corporatist model of interest 
articulation based on functional representation. This 
pattern is related to Duverger’s (1958) social decen-
tralization model (Duverger 1958:74-75).
It is also possible that the party refrains from inte-
grating in its organization one of the sections of the 
partition of the population (e.g., a region in a territo-
rial partition), perhaps forced by circumstances. If this 
section is taken up by some other party, there can 
be an agreement between this (small) party and the 
large party active in the other sections. This agree-
ment may be of a coalitional kind or rather involve the 
small party becoming a collective member of the large 
party: in both cases the small party completes the ar-
ticulation of the large one. The latter more intimate 
sort of agreement is more likely if the partition follows 
a territorial pattern than if it follows a professional one.
Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
autonomy of the decision-making process of a collec-
tive member of a party and the scope of the decisions 
reserved to the collective member. The former is a 
consequence of the collective member being self-gov-
erning. The latter concerns the sphere where the de-
cisions are applied, that is, the exclusive competence 
of the collective member. Let us consider the case of 
the collective member being a regional party complet-
ing the articulation of a national party in a particular 
region. If the region has substantial political autonomy 
within the state, it could be agreed (in practice) that 
all questions concerning regional politics are to be re-
served to the regional party. Alternatively, some key 
decisions of regional politics affecting national politics 
(e.g., choices on coalition partners) could be left to the 
national party (where the regional party has a share 
of power) or to a negotiation between the regional 
and national party. Although the scope of exclusive 
competence of the regional party does not impinge 
on its character as collective member, it is likely that 
in practice it will have a bearing on the share of power 
of the regional party in the national party. Of course, 
the more or less federal structure of the state is an 
important consideration here.
a tyPology
In the previous section we addressed some key 
characteristics and sources of variation among col-
lective members in political parties. In this section we 
take into consideration two main variables in order to 
develop a conceptual and empirical map of collective 
members. We have focused here on the role of these 
types of organizations in the articulation of the over-
all political party and on the socio-political nature of 
such organizations. This map can serve as the ba-
sis of future comparative works on the determinants, 
implications, and dynamics of different types of party 
organizations and collective membership. In this sec-
tion we present also those instances that fit the criteria 
we defined above. These cases have been identified 
after examining all the parties that attained at least 
4% of the votes in the most recent national legislative 
elections in the following West European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Great Britain, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.
We have also considered some cases that come 
close to these subtypes, but which fail to meet the 
two criteria that characterize collective members in 
our classification. Admittedly, some of the cases we 
address present blurred contours. For them, mem-
bership in the subtypes we have developed is so-
mewhat fuzzy, and we have had to decide whether 
they are “more in than out” in the qualitative sets that 
we present here. Table 1 shows the main types of 
collective members on the basis of this typology. It 
takes into consideration the two variables which we 
referred to above: their socio-political nature (verti-
cal dimension) and whether they have an articulating 
character (horizontal dimension).
Articulating Non-articulating








F u n c t i o n a l 
organizations
Trade Unions (British 
Labour Party)
Table 1. A typology of collective members and some 
instances of each subtype in Western European poli-
tics (in parentheses the political party to which collec-
tive members belong)
* Until 2011. After 2012 the Parti Radical became a collective member of the UDI.
Articulating linkage between political parties
A clear instance of a collective member of a politi-
cal nature is that of the party of the Catalan social-
ists (PSC) within the Spanish socialist party (PSOE). 
In this case, the basis of the articulating linkage be-
tween the collective member and the overall party is 
territorial. Firstly, the PSC is not a sub-organization 
of the PSOE. Apart from some (substantial) mutually 
agreed connections, the PSC is a fully sovereign po-
litical party. In particular, the establishment and main-
tenance of the agreement between the PSC and the 
PSOE is a decision of both parties. The PSC could 
break the “contract” without altering its structure. The 
fact that this would almost certainly lead to a split 
in the PSC lies in the sphere of the political conse-
quences of political decisions.
Secondly, the entitlement to power of the PSC in 
the PSOE qualifies the former as a collective member 
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iste Aranès (CDA-PNA) is a political party of the Aran 
Valley, in the Pyrenees. By virtue of an agreement be-
tween CDA-PNA and the Catalan party Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), the former has rep-
resentation rights in the governing bodies of the latter 
and can be considered a collective member.
By contrast, the cases of the Italian Northern 
League, the British Conservative and Liberal parties, 
and the CDU-CSU fail to meet our criteria for collec-
tive membership. At first sight, the Northern League 
(Lega Nord) seems to be based on an articulating 
agreement between different territorial organizations. 
Its Statutes (Art. 1) indicate that the party is a con-
federation of different political organizations (national 
sections according to Art.2.). National sections have 
the right to participate in the decision processes of 
the whole party, in so far as the secretaries of each 
national section are members of the highest politi-
cal body in the League, the Federal Council (Con-
siglio Federale) (Art. 12). However, national sections 
lack true political and institutional autonomy and 
are subjected to the decisions and rules adopted 
by the whole party. This situation resulted from the 
formation process of the party in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. The party emerged out of electoral al-
liances among different local political organizations 
and took shape first in 1989 as a confederation of 
parties (Lega Lombarda, Liga Veneta, Lega Emilia-
Romagna, Union Ligure and Movimento Autonomista 
Piamontese) within the Northern Alliance (Alleanza 
Nord) (Gómez-Reino 2002:95-95). In 1991, howev-
er, the Northern League was launched as a unified 
and even centralized party. In Gómez-Reino’s words 
(2002:96), “what was devised as a confederation 
evolved into a single centralized party under Umberto 
Bossi’s command.” The 1991 statute thus stated that 
the Northern League had “legal ownership” over all 
the different regional labels (Gómez-Reino 2002:97). 
This centralized outcome resulted from the hegem-
ony of the Lombard League and its leader (Bossi), 
from the internal divisions suffered by several other 
local leagues, and from the electoral opportunities 
opened up by the crisis of the Italian party system 
(Gómez-Reino 2002:96-97). 
In Great Britain there are some similarities be-
tween the structures of the Conservative and Liberal 
Democratic parties and the territorial types of collec-
tive membership, but none of these parties meet the 
criteria we defined in our classification. The associa-
tion of the British Conservative Party with its Scottish 
organization could seem similar to that between the 
PSOE and the PSC. In its Constitution, the party con-
siders as members not only the individual members 
(classified into “party members” and “Scottish party 
members”), but also the constituency associations 
and the “Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party” 
as such. But in fact, the Scottish party cannot be 
considered a fully self-governing organization. All the 
of the latter. The relation between the PSC and the 
PSOE is governed by the “Protocol” (1978); a docu-
ment agreed upon on the occasion of the merger of 
the Catalan branch of the PSOE and two Catalan 
socialist parties of the time (PSC-C and PSC-R) to 
create the PSC-PSOE.3 In this agreement, the direct 
participation of the members of the PSC in the Fed-
eral Congress through delegates elected in the same 
way as those of the PSOE was established (thereby 
through the local branches, and in practice the deci-
sional structure of the PSC is kept), as well as a repre-
sentation of the PSC (proportional to the number of its 
members) in the Federal Committee and a participa-
tion in the Executive Commission. After the Federal 
Congress elects the General Secretary, he or she pro-
poses to the Congress the members of the new Exec-
utive Commission. According to the Protocol, the rep-
resentatives of the PSC in the Executive Commission 
will be “proposed or endorsed where appropriate” by 
the PSC delegates in the Congress. Needless to say, 
this splendidly ambiguous wording has usually led to 
last minute bargaining between the recently elected 
General Secretary and the leaders of the Catalan del-
egates in the Congress. Roller and van Houten (2003) 
speak of “the PSC PSOE’s dual nature as a regional 
party and an affiliate of a national party.” 
In the words of Verge and Barberá (2009), “the 
relation between the PSOE and the PSC has been 
characterized by a considerable ambiguity” (our 
translation). Initially, the PSOE and the PSC formed 
separated parliamentary groups in the lower house 
of the Spanish parliament, although “under common 
discipline of speech, action, and vote,” with decisions 
being made after deliberation in common assembly 
and joint meeting of both permanent committees. 
Eventually a common parliamentary group was con-
stituted, in whose executive organs the presence of 
PSC parliamentarians has always been above their 
proportion in the whole group; the vote discipline 
has been very strict (Colomé 2003). As in the Span-
ish Constitution, the President of the Government is 
elected by the lower house of Parliament, and due 
to the ancillary role of the upper chamber in the leg-
islative procedure, the common action of the PSOE 
and the PSC in the lower chamber brings about a 
common action in national politics. In fact, until very 
recently, most Spaniards have perceived both parties 
as “the same thing,” at least at the national level.
The incorporation of the Catalan Esquerra Unida 
i Alternativa (EUiA) in the statewide Spanish United 
Left (IU) is also an instance of party political, territori-
ally-based collective membership. This incorporation 
is asserted in Art. 84 through 94 of the Statutes of 
EUiA, while both the independence of EUiA and its 
representation in the organs of IU are clearly stated 
in Art. 113 of the Statutes of IU.
A third instance of this type also concerns Catalonia. 
Convèrgencia Democràtica Aranesa-Partit Nacional-
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constituency associations (also the Scottish ones) 
are submitted to the British party and they are also 
the basis of its articulation. And the Scottish party 
members participate like the other members in the 
election of the key organs of the party.4 There are two 
substantial characteristics that separate the Scottish 
Conservative Party from the Catalan PSC. Firstly, the 
“constitutional power” lies in the (central) Conserva-
tive Party, which has the right to define the relation 
between the Scottish section and the global party. 
Secondly, the constituency associations in Scotland 
belong to the (global) party as such associations (al-
though their members are “Scottish members”), and 
thus the supervision in the selection of candidates 
to the Parliament in Westminster corresponds to the 
global party. All in all, the Scottish Conservative Party 
can be considered an organization within the articu-
lation of the global Conservative Party rather than a 
collective member as defined above. 
As for the British Liberal Democrats, they have an 
explicitly federal structure, and the Federal party is 
integrated by the state parties of England, Wales, 
and Scotland. However, these state sections lack full 
autonomy and are bound by the Constitution of the 
Party and by the rules made by it (Art. 2.2 of the Party 
Constitution).5 In addition to that, the Federal Party 
reserves to itself exclusive control on several crucial 
policy areas (Art. 2.3 of the Party Constitution). 
Finally, another instance which is close to an ar-
ticulating agreement between political parties is that 
of the CDU-CSU. However, the relation between the 
CSU and the CDU in Germany is that of a coalition 
and therefore the CSU is not a collective member of 
the CDU. In a coalition, none of the parties receives 
an entitlement to decision power in the organizations 
of the other parties. Here it is necessary to distinguish 
between the decisions taken by the organization of 
the party and those made by their members in the 
institutions of the state. Sometimes this distinction is 
not easy, and this is particularly the case with parlia-
mentary groups. In the British tradition, parliamentary 
groups are part of the organization of the parties and 
play a role in their internal decisions (McKenzie 1963). 
In continental political parties, parliamentary groups 
are not generally part of their organization, although 
they are arguably part of their decision structure. 
Then it may be the case that the parties in a coalition 
join in a single parliamentary group. This is the case 
of the CDU and the CSU in the German Bundestag. 
In general, it is difficult to say how far the party alle-
giances of the members of such mixed parliamentary 
groups shape the political alignments in the discus-
sions and how a common position is reached, both 
among the members of each party and in the whole 
group, either by majority voting or negotiation. As for 
the CDU and the CSU in the Bundestag, there is one 
organized subgroup for each party. According to the 
current agreement between these parties, “funda-
mental political decisions of the parliamentary group 
CDU/CSU are to be taken only in agreement between 
both subgroups” (our translation).
Belgian cultural pluralism might seem prone to 
the structures of party-political, articulating collective 
membership, but the divisions of socialist, Christian-
democratic, and liberal parties along linguistic lines 
from the 1960s onwards excluded this possibility. In 
Portugal, the possibility of creating this type of collec-
tive members has been excluded by national legisla-
tion, which directly prohibits the creation of regional 
parties (Art. 9 of the Portuguese Law of Political Par-
ties). This exclusion may have played an important 
role in the development of the party system of Portu-
gal’s Atlantic islands.
Non-articulating linkage between political parties
We can find instances of a non-articulating linkage 
between political parties in the small parties embed-
ded in the UMP, the Christian-Democratic Party (Parti 
Chrétien-Démocrate) and, until 2011, the Radical 
Party (Parti Radical) under the framework of Art. 3 of 
the Statute of the French UMP (Union pour un Mou-
vement Populaire) which contemplates the possibility 
that legal persons (political parties or not) are asso-
ciated to the party.6 The roots of this organizational 
structure are political-ideological rather than territo-
rial and relate to the historical pluralism of the “non-
Gaullist moderate right” (Knapp 2004:199), in which 
three main types of forces were traditionally present: 
the Christian Democrats, the Conservatives, and the 
ideologically oscillating Radicals (Knapp 2004:232). 
These three currents were also present in the now ex-
tinct Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Dé-
mocratie Française), which was defined in its statutes 
as a “federation of political parties” (Knapp 2004:216) 
and which worked in fact as a confederal organization 
of three main independent forces (the Christian Dem-
ocratic Center of Social Democrats, CDS; the con-
servative Independent Republicans, RI; and the Radi-
cal Party), all of which enjoyed equal representation 
rights in the UDF national bodies (Knapp 2004: 216-
7). To some extent, these parties of notables (Knapp 
2004:217-18) continue the long-standing Orleanist 
tradition of the French right (Knapp 2004:201; Ré-
mond 1954; Moreno Recio 1918:149). Despite their 
residual character, they have also held important po-
sitions of power at the local, regional, and national 
levels. For instance, “they enjoyed a constant majority 
in the upper House until 1980” (Knapp 2004:214 and 
217). Given the symbolic, strategic, and institutional 
importance of the groups of the non-Gaullist right 
(Knapp 2004:221), it was clearly justified for the UMP 
to create specific organizational frameworks in order 
to absorb these parties (2007:219). 
For any agreement between political parties, ar-
ticulating or non-articulating, the question arises as 
to whether one of the parties becomes a collective 
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member of the other, or there is merely a coalition 
between them. The relation between an associated 
legal person and the UMP is governed by the associ-
ation agreement, a “contrat de droit privé” according 
to the French Law of Associations of 1901. It is usual 
to keep most clauses confidential. The agreement 
between associated parties and the UMP usually 
stipulates that the joint candidate to the presidential 
election is to be chosen by the UMP. Also the parlia-
mentarians elected to the National Assembly typical-
ly integrate into the common parliamentary group. As 
for the meaning of this to guarantee common political 
action, the personalized character of French politics 
and the fluidity of its party landscape are to be taken 
into account. Typically the members of the associ-
ated legal person become members of the UMP if 
they wish, a representation in the National Council of 
the UMP is agreed (under the conditions fixed by the 
Political Bureau of the UMP), and a subsidy is paid by 
the UMP to the associated legal person. Thus the as-
sociated parties are collective members of the UMP.
The parties integrated in the Belgian liberal party 
Reformist Movement (Mouvement Réformateur, MR) 
also fit our criteria of collective membership. The MR is 
integrated by the Reformist Liberal Party (Parti Réfor-
mateur Libéral, PRL), the dominant component in the 
party and which in fact is reported to have a “fictitious 
existence” (Dedecker 2011:149); the Party for Free-
dom and Progress (Partei für Freiheit und Forschritt, 
PFF), which represents German-speaking citizens; 
and the Movement of Citizens for Change (Mouve-
ment des Citoyens pour le Changement, MCC), a par-
ty of Christian-Democratic origins that split from the 
PSC and first joined an alliance with the PRL in 1999. 
In 2002 this alliance gave rise to a new party, the MR.
Articulating linkage between political parties and 
functional organizations 
There are no instances of articulating linkages be-
tween a party and functional organizations. Perhaps 
the closest case to this combination of circumstances 
is that of the Austrian Popular Party (ÖVP) and its inter-
est organizations. These organizations have participa-
tion rights in the political structure of the ÖVP (Müller 
2006:343) and also enjoy very high levels of autonomy, 
to the point that experts have considered the ÖVP as 
an indirect party (Müller 2006:349). In fact, there have 
been different attempts at curtailing the autonomy of 
the professional organizations of the ÖVP. The concern 
about intersectoral conflicts and the need to assert the 
leadership of the federal party can be perceived in the 
1979 Organization Statute.7 Although something has 
been done since then in this direction, the ÖAAB, ÖBB 
and ÖWB are still a key factor in the dynamic (and the 
static) of the party. However, although these organiza-
tions enjoy high levels of autonomy, they do not meet 
the criterium of being fully self-governed, and are sub-
jected to the rules and political decisions of the ÖVP. 
In addition to the formal rules that specify repre-
sentative rights in the party federal bodies (as in the 
Bundesparteitag; Müller 2006: 343), there are infor-
mal criteria for the sharing out of power among the 
three professional organizations. In this sense Müller 
(2006: 349) writes: “When the composition of some 
body of the party is not to be decided through del-
egation of the professional organizations, but through 
election, there is an implicit apportionment (Proporz) 
among them, which today reaches still up to the lead-
ing bodies of the party, and earlier even included the 
top positions (leader of the party, general secretary, 
leader of the parliamentary group)” (our translation). 
The ÖVP has a double articulation: territorial 
(Landesparteien) and sectorial, through interest sec-
tors (Teilorganisationen). It is an archetypal case 
where the exclusivity of the territorial articulation does 
not hold. Both territorial and sector organizations 
have juridical personality. There are as many territori-
al parties as regions, and six sector organizations for 
blue-collar and white-collar workers (ÖAAB), farm-
ers (ÖBB), business people (ÖWB), women (ÖFB), 
young people (JVP), and senior citizens (ÖSB). Even 
if it is possible to be a member of the ÖVP without 
also being a member of one of the sector organiza-
tions, this is rare in practice.8 The three latter sector 
organizations have correlatives in many other par-
ties, and respond to the idea of “natural groupings” 
for collectives supposed to need their own channels 
of representation and the defense of whose interests 
is not considered particularly “divisive.” In contrast, 
the three former ones (ÖAAB, ÖBB, and ÖWB) are 
supposed to represent all occupational sectors, to 
which are (were or are to be) bound, directly or indi-
rectly, all citizens: they constitute a further articulation 
of the party, parallel to the territorial one. Certainly 
the fact that ÖAAB, ÖBB, and ÖWB represent all oc-
cupational sectors does not mean that the member-
ship of the ÖVP is a mirror image of Austrian society. 
Farmers, public servants, and business people are 
overrepresented in the ÖVP. In the case of the ÖVP, 
this overrepresentation has reached some crystalli-
zation through the professional organizations.
In the German (Bavarian) CSU there are also or-
ganizations (Arbeitsgemeinschaften) for employees, 
business people, and farmers (art. 27 of the Statute). 
The same can be said of the CDU, where there are 
organizations (Vereinigungen) for employees and 
business people (art. 38 of the Statute). However, 
this panoply of organizations is not intended to ar-
ticulate the party, but to look after specific groups by 
targeting the message of the party and channeling 
impulses and suggestions. Furthermore, these func-
tional organizations also lack the level of autonomy 
of the other collective members discussed above. In 
both respects, the occupational organizations are far 
from being structurally essential in the case of both 
the CDU and the CSU (Mintzel 1978).
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Non-articulating linkage between a political party 
and functional organizations 
The trade unions affiliated to the British Labour 
Party are a clear instance of a functional non-articu-
lating collective member. The origins of this relation-
ship lie in the formation process of the Labour party 
itself, which was initially an extension of the trade un-
ions (Scarrow 1996:24). The non-Marxist character 
of British social-democracy may have also favored 
the persistence of this type of organizational link-
age (Bartolini 2000:70-72). The British Labour Party 
admits not only individual members in its structure, 
but also “affiliated organizations,” among which the 
trade unions play a very important role in the life and 
governance of the party. Half of the total voting enti-
tlement in the Party Conference corresponds to the 
affiliated organizations (in practice, mostly the trade 
unions), and half of the elective members of the Na-
tional Executive Committee (NEC) are appointed by 
the trade unions. In the election of the party leader, 
the same voting entitlement (one third each) is ap-
portioned to the affiliated organizations, to individual 
members, and to members of the Commons and 
the European Parliament. The election procedure to 
elect their delegates in the Party Conference is up 
to every union (these delegates choose in turn the 
representatives in the NEC), whereas for the elec-
tion of leader of the party it is laid down that all union 
members paying the “political levy” should participate 
on a one-person-one-vote basis.
The members of the affiliated trade unions can 
opt out of paying the political levy, in which case they 
have no right to vote in the decisions of their union as 
an affiliated organization of the party. But this “opting 
out” must be explicit. In contrast to this, from 1927 to 
1946 the acceptance to pay had to be explicit (oth-
erwise the political levy was not exacted), and the 
result was a marked fall in the number of trade union-
ists paying the political levy.
When collective members are not political par-
ties, they normally represent interest groups. If a 
party has such collective members, rival parties 
may claim to defend the national interest and not 
that of particular groups. In a time of falling parti-
sanship (Dalton and Wattenberg 2009), parties try-
ing to represent a particular section of society risk 
missing decisive electoral targets. Certainly it has 
been affirmed that the trade unions have historically 
been moderate in applying their clout in the Labour 
Party: “Restraint has been the central characteristic 
of the trade union-Labour Party relationship” (Minkin 
1992:26). At any rate, after the “winter of discon-
tent” in 1978-79, the prevailing perception among 
the British electorate was that the Labour Party was 
too dependent on the unions, and that the interests 
of the unions did not coincide in several substan-
tial issues with the national interest. A succession 
of electoral defeats (until the “New Labour” victory 
of 1997) prompted the party to gradually reduce the 
power of the unions qua unions in its organization 
(Quinn 2004). As Kitschelt (1994) has shown, the 
organizational structure of the British Labour party 
contributed decisively to the party’s lack of adjust-
ment to new social demands and to its poor elec-
toral performance in the 1980s.
As in the case of the British Labour Party, the 
Swedish Social Democratic Worker’s Party (SAP) 
has historically had a strong trade union basis (Ver-
ney 1957). It has also been characterized as an 
indirect party (Duverger 1958:28). From 1909 to 
1990, the Swedish Social Democratic Party offered 
the trade unions a “system of facultative collective 
affiliation tempered by an opt-out clause”, as char-
acterized by Fusilier (1954:65). Two features distin-
guished this system from that of the British Labour 
Party. Firstly, the Swedish collective affiliation oper-
ated at the local level: the decision to join the party 
was not up to the national unions as in Britain, but 
each local section of each union had to decide. Sec-
ondly, in the British case, the members of the affili-
ated unions become “indirect members” and have a 
different status from that of “direct members” (and 
the most committed members of the Unions can 
also opt to be direct members), whereas in Sweden 
there was only a category of party members and 
the “indirect” members were indistinguishable from 
the “direct” ones. For this reason, in the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party one can speak of “collec-
tive affiliation”, but not of “collective membership,” 
as defined here. Although the Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation has a representative on the party’s 
executive committee, and the relation between un-
ions and the party is strong (Anthonsen et al. 2011), 
there is nothing that can be described as participa-
tion in shared-rule of the unions in the party. 
Concluding comparative remarks. Towards an 
analysis of the causes and prospects of collec-
tive membership 
In this article, we have examined different types of 
collective membership in contemporary political par-
ties. Our exploration has focused on organizations 
that enjoy full self-government rights and have enti-
tlements to power in the political party in which they 
are embedded. Our analysis has proposed a basic 
descriptive typology of collective members based on 
their nature (party political or functional) and their 
pattern of articulation to the political party they are 
embedded in (whether they help to articulate the 
whole party structure or not). 
Although our typology had a mainly descriptive 
character, the comparative examination of the cases 
we discussed above makes it possible to explore the 
determinants of this type of political organization. It is 
clear, in the first place, that national political institu-
tions do not exercise a direct influence on the emer-
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gence of collective members. The electoral systems 
of the countries considered here include propor-
tional representation (with closed and blocked lists 
as in Spain or with preferential vote as in Belgium) 
and relative or absolute majority representation in 
uninominal districts (Britain and France). Moreover, 
their political-territorial structures cover very different 
degrees of regional autonomy, ranging from federal 
(or quasi-federal) structures to unitary patterns of ter-
ritorial articulation. National political institutions may 
have shaped some specific characteristics of collec-
tive membership in these parties, but they certainly 
did not give rise to this type of organizational linkage 
in these cases. 
Certainly, as Duverger already saw apropos of in-
direct parties, social democratic (particularly of a non-
Marxist kind) and Christian democratic political ideas 
can have facilitated the existence of functional col-
lective members. However, the party political collec-
tive members analyzed here lacked these facilitating 
ideological conditions, even if their existence could 
be loosely linked to specific idiosyncratic political-ide-
ological traditions (such as the federal tradition of the 
Spanish left). Furthermore, the Christian democratic 
and non-Marxist social democratic ideological tradi-
tions were present in other parties that did not even 
approach the development of collective members, 
functional or of a party political nature. 
By contrast, in all positive cases, the creation and 
persistence of collective members can be related to 
the heterogeneity of the political and organizational 
landscapes in which the political parties evolved. The 
character of that heterogeneity may lie in the cultural-
territorial domain (as in the case of the Catalan PSC 
and EUiA, as well as of the Belgian PFF), in the ideo-
logical diversity of a particular political camp (as in 
the cases of the French and Belgian center right), or 
in the strength of trade unions before and during the 
formation process of the British Labour Party. 
Furthermore, in all these cases, collective mem-
bers were created exogenously to the political party 
they joined. In all these respects, the emergence of 
these arrangements can be linked to the starting mo-
ments of political parties and their underlying social 
and political conditions. This comparison reveals the 
importance of path-dependent historical trajectories. 
The role played by exogenous organizations at start-
ing moments can also be grasped in a negative way, 
since we have not identified any instance in which 
a party made a top-down move towards collective 
membership. In those cases in which a party moved 
towards a structure based on overarching collateral 
organizations (as was the case of the Austrian ÖVP), 
such organizations did not attain the levels of political 
autonomy that distinguish collective membership.
The formation processes of collective members 
resemble those of federal and confederal systems 
(as identified by Riker 1964). Collective member-
ship agreements implied exchanges between the 
leaders of organizations placed at different levels. 
But agreements in this case were dominated by 
electoral and policy-making considerations, instead 
of the military factors that Riker identified in the birth 
of federations. Formative agreements between ex-
ogenous organizations worked as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the existence of forms of 
collective membership. Balances of power among 
collective members and national political parties, 
which are conditioned in turn by different factors 
such as changes in social and political conditions 
and individual leaderships, may also lead to the ex-
tinction of this type of political structure. The case 
of the Northern League, which emerged as a politi-
cal confederation and moved immediately towards 
a centralized party under the strong leadership of 
Bossi, shows that exogenous origins do not guar-
antee the persistence of this type of organizational 
linkage. And as Christiansen (2012) has shown, 
changes in socio-economic conditions and public 
attitudes can also affect the benefits that political 
parties and interest groups extract from their coop-
eration agreements, and lead to the weakening or 
even demise of such privileged links.
Current social and political conditions may have 
become adversarial to the development of these 
types of organizational linkages. The decline of so-
cio-political cleavages, rapid changes in social condi-
tions resulting from globalization, the growing impor-
tance of new communication technologies, and in-
tense preferences for direct participation all conspire 
against the development of the comparatively rigid 
structures of collective membership. In this respect, 
the diminishing importance of party organizational 
bases and structures of belonging (Puhle 2002:79-
80; Wolinetz 2002) poses some limits on the continu-
ity of this specific type of organizational linkage. 
One way to assess the perspectives of this type 
of organizational linkage consists in examining 
recent instances of party creation in which a high 
degree of preexisting political and organizational 
pluralism was present, and in which party crea-
tion did not strictly obey a top-down organizational 
logic, that is, in cases in which the political condi-
tions were in principle favorable to the formation of 
structures of collective membership. These are the 
cases of several new organizations in the political 
space of the left and radical left in Southern Eu-
rope, such as Syriza in Greece, the Nouveau Parti 
Anticapitaliste and the Front de Gauche in France, 
and Podemos in Spain. In all these cases, notwith-
standing the high degree of pre-existing political 
and organizational pluralism, new organizations 
avoided the creation of collective members. 
In the case of the parties of the French radi-
cal left, their attempts to deal with the preexisting 
political-organizational complexity of their ideologi-
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cal space did not lead to the formation of collec-
tive members. Mélenchon’s candidacy in the 2012 
presidential elections, which received more than 
11% of the vote in the first electoral round, was en-
dorsed by a classical electoral coalition, the Front 
de Gauche. As for Mélenchon’s party, the Parti de 
Gauche (PG), its statutes defined it as a party of 
militants integrated in circles (Art. 8) and they also 
forbade its members to belong to any other party 
organization (Art. 2). The party statutes accepted 
the possibility of enlarging its Bureau National in or-
der to include representatives of other parties, but 
this circumstance was restricted to parties merging 
with the PG (Art. 13).
The other recently created political formation of 
the French radical left is the Nouveau Parti Antica-
pitaliste (NPA), which was founded in 2009 by polit-
ical forces of Trotskyite orientation. Its main leader, 
Olivier Besancenot, attained more than 4% of the 
vote in the first round of the 2007 presidential elec-
tions, and the sum of votes for the three candidates 
of the Trotskyite parties was over 10% in the first 
round of the 2002 presidential elections (Sperber 
2010). Following the Trotskyite political tradition, 
the 2009 statutes enabled the creation of tenden-
cies and fractions within the party, and specifically 
addressed the problem of assuring voice and rep-
resentation to different positions and platforms in 
the Conseil Politique National (Nouveau Parti An-
ticapitaliste 2009). However, the party chose to 
reject specific organizational linkages for different 
political groups or ideological streams. Overall, the 
party explicitly positioned itself in favor of direct de-
mocracy and against internal structures that filter 
the voice of militants.
The degree of previous political-organizational 
pluralism was lower in the case of Podemos, even 
if also in this case exogenous social movements 
and political organizations (in particular Izquierda 
Anticapitalista) took part in its formation process. 
Podemos avoided not only collective membership, 
but also specific organizational linkages for any kind 
of collateral organizations. Furthermore, the new 
party adopted the rule that no members of other 
national political organizations could be elected to 
positions of authority within the party (point XI.e of 
its Ethical Code) (Podemos 2014). This policy of ex-
clusion of internal party political pluralism led to the 
dissolution of Izquierda Anticapitalista as a political 
party and to its transformation into an association. 
In the case of Podemos, the appeal to direct partici-
pation and the mistrust towards exogenous political 
structures was most likely combined with a strategy 
aimed at maximizing the strategic and top-down co-
ordination of the party, as became apparent in the 
voting system chosen to elect the 62 members of 
its highest national political body, the Consejo Ciu-
dadano, by the Asamblea Ciudadana (which is com-
posed of all the members of Podemos). Under the 
voting system selected by this party, participants 
were able to choose in block a general list of 62 
candidates (by a computer click in this case). In the 
2014 internal election, the 62 candidates elected 
were part of the list endorsed by the party leader, 
Pablo Iglesias. 
Finally, the exclusion of collective members is also 
remarkable in the case of Syriza, which was created 
by a wide array of social and political organizations. 
Syriza eluded collective membership, and chose to 
encourage direct individual participation and open 
decision processes, as well as to transform its former 
components into tendencies (Tsakatika and Elefthe-
riou 2013:12-14; Bournous 2013). 
Certainly, these outcomes may have been fa-
vored by the linkage strategies adopted by the new 
radical left, which have emphasized direct, mass-
based, and bottom-up participatory procedures, 
and which have also shown mistrust of bureaucratic 
structures (including trade unions) (Tsakatika and 
Lisi 2013:9-14). We may be witnessing a relative-
ly recent trend in this respect. The previously dis-
cussed EUiA was integrated into IU in 1998 under 
the form of collective membership. And a few dec-
ades ago, in 1982, a radical left organization, the 
Galician Nationalist Block (BNG), chose to include 
collective members in its organization, most notori-
ously, the Union of the Galician People (UPG); a 
fully independent organization that is represented in 
the national bodies of the BNG and which has con-
sistently played a decisive political role in it (Vilas 
Nogueira and Fernández Baz 2004). 
But it is also quite plausible that the rejection of 
the collective membership formula by new politi-
cal parties is decisively determined by the goal of 
achieving greater ideological and programmatic 
flexibility. Highly decentralized organizations can 
set strong constraints on the strategic flexibility of 
political parties, and can thus lead them (as was 
the case of highly decentralized parties based on 
socialist clubs) to electorally suboptimal strategies 
(Kitschelt 1994:218-253).
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notes
1. As in the case of the relationships between political par-
ties and interest groups. See Christiansen (2012).
2. Often there is an attempt to intensify mediation efforts 
with a particular section of the community, and even 
sometimes to alleviate misgivings. As an example, the 
“Protestant Circle” (“Evangelischer Arbeitskreis”) has 
recognition in the Statute of the German CDU (this is 
not the case for any Catholic counterpart), not without 
reasons. No less a person than Karl Barth resisted 
the idea of the interdenominational (but certainly at 
that time Catholic-dominated) CDU: “…If we were to 
cooperate with them, we should always be at a disad-
vantage – whereas we would seek to be guided by 
the Word of God in practical political questions, the 
Catholics would make their decisions on the basis of 
natural law and would take us for a ride before we had 
reached a conclusion in our deliberations” (quoted in 
Pridham 1977).
3. The possibility of this particular relation is recogni-
zed in the additional provision 1 of the Statute of the 
PSOE. About the Protocol, Hopkin (2009) stated that 
“a confederal agreement was established in 1978 on 
the basis of a “unity protocol” which created a delicate 
compromise between socialist unity and Catalan dis-
tinctiveness. The new party – the PSC-PSOE – was a 
sovereign organization, but one that would participate 
in the statewide socialist project”.
4. The Constitution of the Conservative Party (Sche-
dule 9) reads: “Scottish Party Members are bound 
by the provisions of the Constitution of the Sco-
ttish Conservative and Unionist Party (“SCUP”). 
Notwithstanding any other provision contained 
within this Constitution, the SCUP and Scottish Par-
ty Members shall therefore have only the following 
rights and obligations with respect to the Party within 
this Constitution…”.
5. It has to be said that “any alteration to the relative 
powers and functions of the Federal Party and the State 
Parties” has to be passed also by each State Party (Art. 
2.7 of the Party Constitution).
6. After leaving the UMP, the Radical Party joined the 
Union of Democrats and Independents (Union des 
Démocrates et Indépendants, UDI) in 2012, also as a 
collective member. The UDI is a small center-right poli-
tical party constituted by the PR and other minor politi-
cal organizations, such as the Nouveau Centre and the 
Alliance Centriste.
7. Art. 9.1 of the Organization Statute of the ÖVP reads: 
“The sector organizations must work together when 
they carry out federal election issues, campaigns, 
and contests. The guidelines and tasks assigned for 
this purpose by the federal party are compulsory” (our 
translation). When Alois Mock was elected president 
of the party in 1979, one of the main goals he set was 
to clearly establish the preponderance of the federal 
party on professional organizations. For more on the 
position of the professional organizations in the fun-
ding of the ÖVP, see Sickinger (2009).
8. Admissions to the party and to sector organizations are 
decided independently, although the application form is 
unified. Expulsion from the party is a joint decision of the 
party and sector organizations.
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